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NOTES
RECENT SUPREME COURT LIMITATIONS ON
FEDERAL JURISDICTION
A HARMO NOUS working relationship between federal and state courts is
basic to the effective functioning of our dual system of government., Originally
Congress conferred jurisdiction upon the lower federal courts primarily over
controversiesbetween citizens of differentstates 2 andlater over litigation involv-
ing a substantial federal question.8 A strong movement to restrict the authority
of federal courts over problems essentially of state concern, stemming originally
from a fear of judicial interference with programs of social reform,4 moved
Congress to withdraw federal jurisdiction to enjoin proceedings in state courts,6
1. The literature is legion. See Brown, The Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts
Based on Diversity of Citizenship (1920) 78 U. oF PA. L. Rav. v79; Clark,
Diversity of Citizenship .urisdiction of Federal Courts (1933) 19 A. B. A. J. 499; Frank-
furter, A Note on Diversity Jurisdiction-In Reply to Professor Yntema (1931) 79 U. or
PA. L. Rv. 1097; Frankfurter, Distribution of Judicial Power between United States and
State Courts (1928) 13 CORN. L. Q. 499; Friendly, The Historic Basis of Diversity Jurisdic-
tion (1928) 41 HARv. L. REv. 483; Newlin, Proposed Limitations Upon Our Federal Courts
(1929) 15 A. B. A. J. 401; Pogue, State Determination of State Law and the Judicial Code
(1928) 41 HARv. L. Rxv. 623; Warren, Federal and State Court Interference (1930) 43
HAxv. L.- REv. 345; Yntema, The Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts in Controversies Be-
tween Citizens of Different States (1933) 19 A. B. A. J. 71, 149, 265; Yntema and Jaflin,
Preliminary Analysis of Concurrent Jurisdiction (1931) 79 U. OF PA. L. REV. 869; Com-
ment (1932) 31 MicH. L. REv. 59.
2. 1 STAT. 73 (1789).
3. 18 STAT. 470, 28 U. S. C. §41 (1940).
4. Clark, supra note 1; Frankfurter, Distribution of Judicial Power between United
States and State Courts (1928) 13 CORN. L. Q. 499; A Note on Diversity Jurisdiction-In
Reply to Professor Yntema (1931) 79 U. OF PA. L. REV. 1097; Comment (1932) 31 Mxcit.
L. R v. 59.
5. 1 STAT. 334 (1861), 28 U. S. C. § 379 (1940). This Act was not well received by
the Federal Bench. After having been ignored for a long time, it was riddled with judicial
exceptions. See Warren, Federal and State Court Interference (1930) 43 HARv. L. Rrv.
345, 348. Thus it seemed well settled that it would not be applied where an injunction was
used to redner effective prior federal jurisdiction [French v. Hay, 22 Wall. 250 (U. S.
1874); Rickey Land & Cattle Co. v. Miller & Lux, 218 U. S. 258 (1910)]; where a case
had been properly removed to a federal court [Dietsch v. Huidelkoper, 103 U. S. 494
(1880) ) ; or to prevent the enforcement of a judgment fraudulently obtained in a state court
[Marshall v. Holmes, 141 U. S. 589 (1891)].
More recently, however, the Supreme Court, by elaborating the principle that courts
of equity do not restrain criminal prosecutions, has reversed the trend towards limiting the
statute. It has failed to overrule the previous judicial exceptions expressly, preferring to
base its decisions on want of equity. Thus in Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U. S. .157
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orders by state utility commissions,0 collection of state taxes,7 and certain labor
activities.8 Despite repeated and persistent Congressional refusals to limit fed-
eral judicial power further,9 the Supreme Court has developed certain additiomal
limitations to the legislative grant. In these cases, however, reversing the as-
sumption of jurisdiction over controversies, in spite of the fact that the statu-
tory jurisdictional requirements had been met, the Court has failed to evolve a
consistent policy, and, in consequence, a litigant often may not know whether
he can institute proceedings in a federal court.
In certain of the cases where the Supreme Court limited the jurisdiction of
the federal courts, it has ordered the inferior tribunals to relinquish jurisdiction
to expert state administrative agencies established especially to handle the type
of problem involved in the litigation. Though implicit in some early casesY°
this policy was crystallized in Pennsylvania. W. illiams.1' After a receiver had
been appointed by a federal district court to liquidate a building and loan asso-
ciation, the state attorney general petitioned the court for a discharge of the
receivership, claiming an exclusive right to administer the debtor's assets had
been vested in the State Secretary of Banking under a local statute. In revers-
ing the district court's decision denying the petition, the Supreme Court declared
that, although the court had jurisdiction, it should have exercised its equitable
(1943), a city ordinance made distribution of pamphlets without a taxed license punishable
by fine or imprisonment. Plaintiff Jehovah's Witnesses invoking federal jurisdiction on the
ground that such an ordinance violated the Fourteenth Amendment sought an injunction to
restrain their prosecution. The Supreme Court, which had previously held the ordinance
unconstitutional, decided, nevertheless, that an injunction should not be granted since there
was no threat of "irreparable injury." Yet only. a determined conceptual reading of the
term "irreparable injury" would exclude the threat of criminal prosecution from that cate-
gory. See Borchard, Challengin "Penal" Statutes by Declaratory Action (1943) 52 YALE
L. J. 445,461. See also Comment (1936) 46 YALE L. J. 255. It would seem that the rationale
of the Douglas and similar cases was based on a new policy concept demanding punctilious
regard for independent state right, and that the ordinary requisites for an injunction were
redefined in terms of that policy. While the wisdom of these decisions has been doubted,
they have laid down a clear doctrine easily applicable to new cases.
The only judicial exception to the Act of 1793 which has been approved recently by
the reconstituted Supreme Court is the one where a federal court takes custody of a res
before a state court. A federal injunction of the state court is allowed to prevent an unseemly
struggle between the two courts over the property. Toucey v. New York Life Insurance C...
314 U. S. 118 (1941). See Note (1942) 52 YALE L. J. 150.
6. 48 STAT. 775 (1934), 28 U. S. C. §41 (I) (1940).
7. 50 STAT. 738 (1937), 28 U. S. C. § 41 (I) (1940).
8. 47 STAT. 70 (1932), 29 U. S. C. §§ 101-115 (1940).
9. For recent instances see SEN. RFs. No. 626, 70th Cong., 1st Sess. (1928) ; SF'.. R.i,.
No. 691, 71st Cong., 2d Sess. (1930) ; SEx. REP. No. 530, 72d Cong., Ist Sess. (1932) ; SF.
REP. No. 701, 72d Cong., Ist Sess. (1932).
10. Compare Gilchrist v. Interborough Rapid Transit Co., 279 U.S. 159 (19-9) : Ruger,
v. Guaranty Trust Co., 288 U. S. 123 (1933).
11. 294 U. S. 176 (1935). The case was correctly followed in Gordon v. Ominsky, 294
U. S. 186 (1935) ; Gordon v. Washington, 298 U. S. 30 (1935).
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discretion to relinquish it in order to show "a proper regard for the rightful inde-
pendence of state governmnent." 12 A later case indicated that this decision was
based on realistic recognition that it is wasteful to liquidate a debtor in an in-
expert court when there is available expert administrative machinery. In the
Bradford case,13 the Supreme Court held that a receiver of a national bank was
privileged to have his status as cestui, in a trust originally administered by the
bank, determined by the federal district court, even though control of the trust
had previously been passed to a new receiver appointed by a state court. The
Court distinguished the Williams case, pointing out that the mere concurrent
jurisdiction of state and federal courts did not create the same type of conflict
as arose when a federal court interfered with a state administrative agency.
In other situations the Supreme Court has ordered relinquishment of juris-
diction to state courts ostensibly because of reluctance to decide a case on consti-
tutional grounds or to adjudicate unsettled questions of local law. Thus in an
early case," a state administrative order was challenged in a federal district
court as violative of the Federal Constitution, but the outcome of the constitu-
tional problem depended on a prior determination of an unsettled question of
construction of a state statute. The Court held that the district court should
have refused to exercise jurisdiction, declaring that construction of state statutes
should be left to local courts. Similarly, where jurisdiction was also invoked
by reason of a federal constitutional question but the controversy could have
been decided either on the constitutional ground or on an alternative indepen-
dent ground of state law, the Court, reluctant to decide the constitutional issue,
ruled that jurisdiction should have been relinquished. 10 It had long been settled
that once a court obtained jurisdiction because of the existence of a federal
question it could retain it whether or not adjudication of the federal question
ultimately became necessary.10 However, the Court's reluctance to have such
12. 294 U. S. 176,185 (1934).
13. Commonwealth v. Bradford, 297 U. S. 613 (1936). Compare Railroad Commis-
sioner of Texas v. Rowan & Nichols Oil Co., 310 U. S. 573 (1940), Note (1942) 51 YA=u
L. J. 680. In that case, the Court held that when a federal court is asked to enjoin an order
of a state administrative agency, challenged as violative of the Fourteenth Amendment, it
should resolve all doubts concerning the order's constitutionality in favor of administrative
agency whose expertness it should trust. The opinion, however, was not based on jurisdic-
tional grounds.
14. Gilchrist v. Interborough Rapid Transit Co., 279 U. S. 159 (1929).
15. Railroad Commission of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U. S. 496 (1941). Comment
(1941) 54 HARv. L. RFV. 1379, Note (1941) 50 YAix L. J. 1272. But compare Lane v. Wil-
son, 307 U. S. 268 (1939), involving racial discrimination, which may indicate a different.
treatment of civil liberty cases, although it is distinguished in the Pullman case on other
grounds. This policy has been followed even though jurisdiction rested on diversity of
citizenship. Chicago v. Fieldcrest Dairies, Inc., 316 U. S. 168 (1942). The constitutional
issue was considered not "substantial" by the Court. Id. at 173.
16. Tennessee v. Davis, 100 U. S. 257, 264 (1879) ; Southern Pac. R. R. v. Califor-
nia, 118 U. S. 109 (1886) ; Fallbrook Irrigation District v. Bradley, 164 U. S. 112 (1896)
Siler v. Nashville R. R., 213 U. S, 175 (1909);
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cases decided in the national courts was a plausible, if not logically necessary,
consequence of the circumstance that it sought to avoid a decision on the fed-
eral constitutional issue,17 while, at the same time, the existence of that issue
was the only basis for federal jurisdiction.
More recently the Supreme Court has extended its policy of staying the
federal courts' jurisdiction, when applicable state laws was doubtful, to situations
where jurisdiction rested on diversity of citizenship, and a federal question not
a constitutional problem was involved. Thus in Thompson v. Magnolia Petro-
leum Co.'s an unsettled question of state property law, involved in the disposal
of a railroad reorganization pending in a bankruptcy court, was remanded to
the state court for decision. Since decision of the question by the federal court
would not have hampered the work of an administrative agency, the only adverse
consequence would have been the possibility of a different holding by the
Illinois Supreme Court in a later case between different litigants. While
this decision stated another judicial limitation of federal jurisdiction, it was,
nevertheless, not inconsistent with prior limitations.
Considerable uncertainty and confusion has been introduced, however, by two
decisions rendered by the Supreme Court in the last two terms. Not only are
these two cases in conflict with each other, but they would seem to disregard
prior limitations on federal jurisdiction enunciated by the Court. In one, Bur-
ford v. Sun Oil Co.," the plaintiff corporation challenged an oil proration order
of the Texas Railroad Commission on the ground that it was issued in violation
of Texas law and the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution. Pur-
suant to a Texas statute permitting any "interested person affected" by "any
order" of the Commission to contest its validity in a court of competent juris-
diction,20 the Sun Oil Co. *petitioned the federal district court to enjoin the
Commission's order, alleging diversity of citizenship and the existence of a
federal question as the bases for jurisdiction. The Supreme Court, in upholding
the decision of the district court dismissing the case, declared that as a matter
of sound equitable discretion, the court should not have assumed jurisdiction
because "delay, misunderstanding of local law, and needless federal conflict with
the state policy are the inevitable product of this double system of review." The
Supreme Court also found federal jurisdiction inappropriate because "the judi-
cial review of the Commission's decisions in the state courts is expeditious, and
adequate." 21
17. Light v. United States, 220 U. S. 523 (1911) ; Siler v. Louisville & N. IL R., 213
U. S. 175 (1909) ; see Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U. S. 288, 347 (1936)
(concurring opinion).
18. 309 U. S. 478 (1940).
19. 319 U. S. 315 (1943).
20. TFx. Rrv. CIviL STAT. AxN. (Vernon, 1925) Art. 6049c. The question of statu-
tory interpretation is ably discussed in Mr. Justice Frankfurter's dissent in Burford v. Sun
Oil Co., 319 U. S. 315, 342-44 (1943).
21. Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U. S. 315, 327 (1943).
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In the other recent case-Meredith v. City of Winter Haven 2 -holders of
the municipality's bonds sued the city in the federal district court, resting juris-
diction on diversity, and alleging that the city was about to call and retire the
bonds without providing for payment of certain deferred interest coupons. Ad-
mittedly, the legality of the city's proposed action depended upon the interpre-
tation of doubtful questions of Florida law. The district court, resolving these
doubts in the city's favor, dismissed the action on the merits. On appeal, the
circuit court of appeals held that the district court should have refused to take
jurisdiction, because "it has been the rule of federal courts where questions of
state law involving provisions of statutes or constitutions, especially with mat-
ters of general public concern in a particular state, to decline to determine the
state law and to remit the litigant to the state court." 23 On certiorari, the Su-
preme Court reversed, holding that "the difficulties of ascertaining what the
state courts may hereafter determine the state law to be do not in themselves
afford a sufficient ground for a federal court to decline to exercise its jurisdiction
to decide a case which is properly brought to it for decision." 24 The opinion
stressed "the duty of the federal courts . . . to decide questions of state law,"
explaining that only in "exceptional cases" "some recognized public policy"
may warrant the non-exercise of a jurisdiction conferred by statute.25 The
majority opinion went on to lay down eight categories 20 of such exceptional
cases. One of these categories comprises controversies in which a federal court
would be called upon to "appraise or shape domestic policy of the state govern-
ing its administrative agencies," 27 for which the Court cited the Burford case.
While the opinion of the Court in the Burford case is ostensibly premised on
the discretionary character of equity jurisdiction, the decision amounts to a
judicial limitation of federal jurisdiction. It is true that the "public interest" is
one of the factors which courts of equity have historically considered in deciding
whether to grant or deny an injufiction, but this "public interest" was relevant
in the consideration of the merits of complainant's case, and not in the determina-
tion of his right to be heard. Moreover, it is doubtful whether the Supreme
Court intended to limit the self-restraining policy enunciated to injunction pro-
ceedings against state administrative agencies, while allowing district courts
22. 320 U. S. 228 (1943).
23. Meredith v. City of Winter Haven, 134 F. (2d) 202, 207 (C. C. A. 5th, 1943).
24. Meredith v. City of Winter Haven, 320 U. S. 228,234 (C. C. A. 5th, 1943).
25. Id. at 234.
26. The categories are (1) non-interference with a recognized, defined public policy,
(2) non-interference with state criminal prosecutions, (3) non-interference with fiscal
affairs of the state, (4) non-interference with the state function of prescribing utility rates,
(5) non-interference with state liquidation of a bank, (6) refusal to appraise or shape do-
mestic policy of the state governing its administrative agencies, (7) failure of an equitable
cause of action, and (8) refraining from unnecessary decisions of constitutional questions.
Id. at 235-36.
27. Id. at 235.
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still to entertain suits under diversity jurisdiction for declaratory judgments
or for damages in tort. For, palpably, the whole purpose of the case would be
frustrated if federal courts were still left free to issue declaratory judgments,
which would render the conflict between the individual producers of oil and
the state regulatory agency res judicata and which could be enforced by appro-
priate process in the state courts. Similarly, in any action to recover damages
for the allegedly illegal and tortious acts of a state official seeking to enforce
an oil proration order, the federal court would necessarily have to pass on the
legality of the particular order, which is the very question the Supreme Court
desires to leave for the state tribunals. Hence, the implication of the Burford
opinion is that federal district courts will no longer enforce rights arising under
Texas' oil proration statutes. The fact that the injunctiorl is the device almost
invariably used to enforce such rights permitted the Supreme Court to talk in
terms of "equity jurisdiction," although the net result is a limitation on the Con-
gressionally conferred jurisdiction of federal district courts.
Moreover, the Burford limitation does not seem to fall within any of the
previously enunciated judicial exceptions to federal jurisdiction. Unlike the
Williams case,28 jurisdiction in the Burford case was not relinquished to an ex-
pert administrative agency which could handle the problem more efficiently and
expeditiously but to another court of general jurisdiction.- Nor could relin-
quishment have been induced because jurisdiction rested on the presence of a
constitutional question which could be avoided by deciding the case on an alter-
native ground of state law,30 since jurisdiction also rested on diversity of citizen-
ship. Finally, refusal to decide the case in the federal forum could not have been
based, as in the M11agnolia case,31 on the necessity of resolving an unsettled prob-
lem of state law, since the applicable statute had recently been interpreted by the
Texas courts.32 In consequence, the Burford case seems to state another judi-
cial restriction upon the exercise of federal jurisdiction-one based on an un-
certain policy favoring enforcement of important state policies, as embodied in
legislation, in state courts. While the specific issue before the Court involved
an oil proration program, the principle enunciated would seem to cover all
state regulatory legislation.
In the Meredith case, however, the policy of non-interference with a state
policy pronounced in the Burford case was apparently disregarded. For it would
seem difficult to distinguish in principle between the state policy expressed in
the bond-issuing function of a municipality and the function of administrative
agencies enforcing oil proration programs. A realistic differentiation may be
28. 294 U. S. 176 (1935).
29. Compare Commonwealth v. Bradford, 297 U. S. 613 (1936).
30. See stpra note 15.
31. 309 U. S. 478 (1940).
32. Railroad Commission v. Shell Oil Co., 139 Te. 66,80, 161 S. W. (2d) 1022 (1942);
Cook Drilling Co. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 139 Tex:. 80, 161 S. IV. (2d) 1035 (1942) ; Gulf Land
Co. v. Atlantic Refining Co., 143 Tex. 59, 70-71, 131 S. IV. (2d) 73 (1939).
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forced to predicate itself upon comparison of the newness of most administrative
agencies with the time honored bond-issuing activity of state and municipal
governments. Awareness of that difference may have been a strong factor in
the Court's decision. Historically, perhaps the most important reason for the
establishment of diversity jurisdiction seems to have been a desire to safeguard
interstate commerce by assuring access to strong creditors' courts 33 -afactor
which was firmly entrenched as a judicial principle in Gelpcke v. Dubuque 34
and the series of cases following.35 Yet the Court did not find it necessary to
make explicit any such distinguishing considerations.
More puzzling than the Court's tenuous distinction of the Burford case in
the Meredith case was perhaps its failure to apply the policy declared in the
Magnolia case.3 6 SiAce admittedly the legality of the city's action in the Mere-
dith case depended on the interpretation of a doubtful question of state law, the
federal court, under the Magnolia doctrine, should have remanded the unsettled
state question for decision in the state courts. But perhaps the decision in the
Meredith case also denotes a return to an exclusive reliance on statutory lan-
guage restricting the exercise of federal jurisdiction, which would limit the
holdings of cases stating greater restraints to their particular facts. On the
other hand, the Meredith decision may in turn also be restricted to its facts,
leaving the seemingly conflicting doctrines of earlier cases intact, and avail-
able for application to new factual situations.
It is difficult to find any logically consistent reconciliation of the results in
the Burfard, Magnolia, and Meredith cases. Moreover, in soliciting approval of
these conflicting decisions by its dicta, the Court has failed to articulate a syste-
matic policy, talking instead in terms of high level abstractions- such
as the need to avoid "delay, misunderstanding of local law and needless
federal conflict with state policy" " and the "rightful independence of state
governments." 38 There has been no attempt to relate these abstractions to
operational principles in specific factual situations. In consequence, the Court,
33. "There was a vague feeling that the new [federal] courts would be strong courts,
creditors' courts, business men's courts." Friendly, The Historic Basis of Diversity Jurls-
diction (1928) 41 HAIv. L. REv. 483, 498.
34. 1 Wall. 175 (U. S. 1863). See Thayer, The Case of Gelpcke v. Dubuque (1891) 4
Hagv. L. Rav. 311.
35. See, e.g., Meyer v. Muscatine, 1 Wall. 384 (U. S. 1863) ; Riggs v. Johnson County,
6 Wall. 166 (U. S. 1867) ; Butz v. City of Muscatine, 8 Wall. 575 (U. S. 1869) ; Olcott v.
The Supervisors, 16 Wall. 678 (U. S. 1872); Township of Pine Grove v. Talcott, 19 Wall.
666 (U. S. 1873) ; Taylor v. Ypsilanti, 105 U. S. 60 (1881) ; Thompson v. Perrine, 106 U. S.
589 (1882).
36. The absence of an explanation is particularly puzzling in view of the fact that the
Mag;wlia case is cited in the Court's opinion for a comparison with cases involving a con-
stitutional question-a category in which this case could scarcely fall. See Meredith v. City
of Winter Haven, 320 U. S.228, 246 (1943).
37. See Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U. S. 315, 327 (1943).
38. See DiGiovanni v. Camden Ins. Ass'n, 296 U. S. 64, 73 (1935).
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while repeating its emotionally appealing maxims,30 has created the very real
problem that a litigant in many instances can not tell whether a case begun in
a federal court, in reliance on statutory jurisdiction, will be remanded to a state
court, after having been tried on the merits and appealed to the Supreme Court.
It would seem more conducive to a speedy and predictable administration of
justice if the Supreme Court left formulation of the principles concerning dis-
tribution of judicial business between state and federal courts to Congress,4
0
and limited itself to enforcement of the hitherto clear legislative mandate.4 1
39. Compare Mr. Justice Holmes' discussion of "unreal explanations," "unreal for-
mulas;' and "inadequate generalizations." Houzxs, Law in Science and Science in Law
in CoL.Lcrim LEGAL P.zns (1920) 210, 229-30. Compare also OGD.. and RicI, , s, Tnz
MfEANING OF MEANING (1927) c. 2.
40. Apart from the propriety of judicial legislation, the Supreme Court's notion that
"delay, misunderstanding of local law, and needless federal conflict with State palicy, are
the inevitable product of this double system of review" may be challenged in the light of cur-
rent conditions. Since the federal courts are by and large nearly current in their dockets,
delay occurs only when a case begun in the federal courts is held in abeyance pending a
decision in the state courts on the local law involved. As for misunderstanding local law,
it is difficult to perceive how this can be a source of conflict when the federal courts are bound
to follow the appropriate state law and to remand to the state courts when the controlling
state law is not clear. It would seem, therefore, that the charge that heedless federal con-
flict is the inevitable product of this double system of review can only mean that in the assess-
ment of evidence and other elements which enter into a judicial judgment, a federal judge
may make judgments different from those which a state judge may make. The fact that
they are different does not mean, however, that the decisions of a federal judge are always
adverse to the state and those of a state judge always favorable to the state, or that federal
judges are necessarily less honest, competent, or learned than state judges.
There is no question but that there has been "needless federal conflict' in the past, but it
is significant that the greatest conflict occurred in the early years of the depression. It is
possible that the antipathy toward state regulation which was expressed through the medium
of diversity jurisdiction did not reflect a prejudice against states per se, but an intense dis-
like of government regulation in general, and that Erie Railroad v. Tomphins and changed
judicial predilections have removed this, the real source of the conflict.
41. To do so, the Court might have to repudiate the doctrines of the Magnolia and
Burford cases and to limit the cases involving a constitutional question explicitly to their
facts. The principle of equitable discretion could remain a useful techmique for declining
jurisdiction in situations where, as in the Willian case, its exercise would be patently waste-
ful, idle, or frivolous.
